The Bonding of Warriors
A Unit History
The Early Years (1966-1967)
Ch 6
by Winslow "Rick" Stetson
Adrenaline was rushing and hearts pounding as the helicopter neared the LZ. The heat rushing in the open doors and the "pop, pop, pop" sound as the blades changed pitch while the aircraft flared for a landing told them they were moments away from scrambling into the jungle. The patrol dashed for the nearest concealment and froze in place as the sounds of the helicopters faded away. This was the crucial moment. Senses strained to pick-up any sight or sound made by an enemy who might have been watching the LZ. If they had been spotted, this is when the VC would start looking for them. Minutes passed and the quiet of the jungle became reassuring. Finally, the operations officer circling high above in the command and control ship asked on the radio how the light was. "Red" meant trouble and "green" indicated everything was good so far. The light was green so the gunships, the pickup aircraft, and the C&C ship headed back to Bearcat leaving the patrol on their own. The men moved into the jungle in search of a suitable night position. Cottrell selected a spot in the thickest undergrowth they could find and the patrol settled in for the night. The experienced men rested well but Jones was more apprehensive and got little sleep.
The first day was uneventful and dampened by steady drizzle. The team zigzagged through the jungle searching for trails or any other signs the enemy was in the area. A radio relay aircraft flew over for a SITREP and the patrol leader reported no sign of enemy activity and gave the patrol's location in code. Again, they found a thick growth of vegetation in which to spend the second night.
The next morning, the patrol moved out on their pre-planned route and came upon a well-used trail. It was early in the day and footprints were visible in the mud. It was obvious the trail had been used recently and the enemy had to be nearby. Cottrell decided to take up positions and monitor the trail. He moved his men across and placed them in positions about five meters apart where they paralleled the trail and could observe without being detected. It wasn't long before the first enemy soldier was spotted moving quickly along the trail, coming from the right of the patrol. He was wearing an olive green uniform and carrying a chicom rifle, holding it by the barrel as it rested on his shoulder. Following about 20 meters behind came another similarly dressed and armed soldier. Behind him came another yet another NVA.
After waiting a several minutes and seeing no additional enemy, Cottrell moved the team briskly away from the trail and out of the area. The patrol had traveled just a short distance when they came upon a small clearing where they found a poncho shelter erected on four bamboo poles stuck in the ground. Under the shelter was a five-gallon square can with the top cut off. The area looked as if it had been occupied recently and Cottrell assumed it was an outpost for a larger complex nearby, probably located in the direction where the enemy soldiers had come from. Sensing there could be an ambush in the vicinity, Cottrell directed his point man, Jones, to head off at a ninety-degree angle away from the outpost and a possible ambush. As they were moving away from the clearing, the patrol members heard a rifle shot and a muffled explosion that sounded like a grenade. The team immediately went into the standard reaction drill used to break contact, escape and evade (E&E). Each lurp assumed a position with every other man facing to the right or left. The last in line, Marble, faced the direction of the enemy and fired his weapon on fall automatic. He emptied his magazine and turned away from the enemy reloading his weapon as he ran. Each man would in turn repeat the procedure before following the assistant team leader.
Jones, the last to fire, emptied his magazine and tossed a white phosphorous (Willie peter) grenade before turning to catch up with the escaping team. As Jones tried to run through the thick vegetation, his rucksack became entangled in the "wait-a-minute" vines. He quickly shed the pack and left it on the ground as he caught up with the patrol. They ran for several hundred meters before stopping to listen and determine if they were being followed. They were not and the patrol leader called for an extraction. Afterwards, Cottrell was quoted in a newspaper account of the action as saying, "We hit our firing plan and moved out smartly." The Old Reliable paper continued the dramatic account: "It gets hairy out there," Cottrell said frankly. "That business was a surprise and we don't like to get surprised. It was a good thing we used our diversionary tactics, it was a damn close shave." Cottrell and Marble received the Bronze Star with V device for the actions on the patrol while Jones was awarded the Army Commendation Medal with V for valor.
The long range patrol received considerable publicity for a June 1967 patrol led by SSG Robert Syndram. The Old Reliable's June 24th edition headed the story detailing the patrols action as, "Five-Man Recon Team Bailed Out of Tight Spot by Arty, Gunships." The Stars and Stripes carried the same story under the heading, "9th Inf. Recon Team's Ordeal. The VC Were 10 to l Against Us." Long Thanh. Out numbered 10 to l, a five-man team from the U.S. Army's 9th Inf. Div. Long Range Reconnaissance Platoon became the prey of a Viet Cong manhunt recently. After five hours of fight and flight, the team escaped the enemy thanks to the pinpoint accuracy of artillery fire and a withering onslaught from helicopter gunships.
A lone enemy soldier had spotted the recon team. SP4 Donald Naughton of Norwalk, CA was forced to mow down the approaching enemy with his M16 rifle. The chattering gun gave away the team's position. "They knew we were in there and they were determined to find us," Team Leader SSG Robert Syndram of FT Wayne, IN recalled afterward. The team attempted to avoid detection by moving frequently but twice narrowly missed being cut down by enemy machine gun fire. Breaking for a nearby knoll, they scrambled to the top and set up a perimeter using fallen trees and rocks for cover. Minutes later, the heavily armed enemy platoon reached the knoll and surrounded it as the team desperately radioed for aid. After three hours without making radio contact, the 9th Infantry Division artillery observer's plane arrived overhead for a routine radio check.
The surrounded troops explained the situation to 1st LT Stewart McGregor, the aerial observer. McGregor radioed artillerymen at the Black Horse base of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment about three miles northwest of the knoll. At about 2:30 PM the first rounds thundered in on the enemy position. "They were good, close groups and right on target," the observer recalled. "The rounds were coming in right on their heads," Syndram said.
Meanwhile, helicopter gunships of the 9th Infantry Division's Troop D, 3rd Squadron, 5th Armored Cavalry, had scrambled. The artillery fell silent shortly after 3:30 PM and "that's when the gunships took over," McGregor related. Rockets and miniguns raked the enemy position to secure a landing zone where another chopper from. Troop D could land to pick up the team. CPT William (Wild Bill) Bailey and WO William Brayshaw landed the rescue chopper about 200 meters southwest of the knoll. The team sprinted to the waiting helicopter. At 4:30, five and half-hours after the enemy force had first surrounded them; the recon team was on its way back to the division's base camp.
By July, 1967, the 9th Infantry Division's long range patrol platoon had been operating in Vietnam for almost half a year. During that time, the LRRPs had obtained valuable intelligence about enemy activity within the division's area of operations but being just a platoon size, the number of patrols that could operate at any given time was limited. Thus, the decision was made by the 9th Infantry Division to increase the LRRP Detachment to a company size unit.
The 9th Infantry Division Chief of Staff, a blunt spoken colonel by the name of M.W. Kendall, wanted an experienced unit commander to form the detachment into a company. The call went out for Clarence 'Clancy' Matsuda, commander of A Company, 3rd Battalion, 60th Infantry. Matsuda was a 29-year old captain who had attended West Point and received his commission after completing OCS at Fort Benning, Georgia. In May 1967, Matsuda had been awarded the Silver Star for leading his company with distinction on 2 May, 1967, during the Battle of Ap Bac, a fierce fight in which two of his men, Leonard Keller and Raymond Wright, later received the Congressional Medal of Honor. Matsuda had considerable leadership experience going back to his initial assignment as a recon platoon leader with an airborne battle group on Okinawa followed by a tour at Fort Bragg where he was executive officer of a raider detachment in the 82nd Airborne Division. He then commanded a rifle company in the Dominican Republic and a headquarter company at Ft Bragg, N. C. (this assignment was made primarily to take on the then precarious Command Maintenance Management Inspection (CMMI) in the 82nd's 2nd Battalion, 505th Infantry.
Matsuda's battalion commander, LTC Doty, was newly assigned to the 60th and did not want to lose one of his best commanders to the LRRPs so he flew to Bearcat to personally appeal to the chief of staff. COL Kendall was not persuaded and told the battalion commander that Matsuda was the man he wanted to lead the long range patrol. Matsuda's tour as commander of the rifle company was over. He packed his belongings, said farewell to his company and prepared to move to Bearcat for his new assignment. First, however, he was instructed to report to the ill-natured Kendall who did not hide his opinion of the LRRPs. 'They jump at shadows,' the former First Brigade Commander barked at Matsuda. 'Their image stinks. Fix it. Now get out of here.' The new LRRP Commander, according to officers who had served under the crusty chief of staff, had just been 'Kendallized.'
On July 8, 1967, CPT Clancy Matsuda assumed command of the 9th Infantry Division Long Range Patrol. Facing him was the considerable task of taking the unit from a platoon to a company and there was no time to hold a formal change of command ceremony. LT Lawrence was moved to the position of executive officer while LT Stetson remained as the unit's operations officer. LT Garrison transferred to a rifle company in the Delta where he would perform with distinction and go on to become a career Army officer. Matsuda would also make a career out of the Army and serve for over 30 years before retiring as a full colonel.
The unit was given priority to be filled at the 100% level utilizing volunteers who would be screened through an interview process. When it came to selecting his officers, the new commander took advantage of his West Point Connections. One of his good friends at the Academy, MAJ Jim Blesse, was the 9th Infantry Division assistant G-1 and in charge of assignments for company grade officers. He let Matsuda have his pick of all incoming lieutenants and as a result, hard-charging young officers Dale Dickey and Henry Richard Hester were assigned to the rapidly expanding unit.
LT Edison K. Woodie did not join the LRRPs through the replacement pipeline. He served with Matsuda in the 3rd Battalion, 60th Infantry as the Heavy Mortar platoon leader. Woodie was a Ranger qualified officer with an outstanding reputation as a strong (he had been a body builder competitor) and courageous warrior. Matsuda "arranged" Woodie's assignment to the LRRPs through MAJ Blesse. Like Matsuda and the other hand picked officers, Woodie led by example and was eager to get in the jungle and start patrolling. Woodie's sense of humor fit in nicely with the LRRPs who never minded pulling the legs of non-rangers. One time a soldier asked Woodie why his survival mirror had a hole in the center of it. (The mirrors were carried by all patrol members and the opening was to help aim the mirror at an aircraft.) With a straight face Woodie said to the soldier, 'That's so if I am shaving while in the field, I can look through the mirror to make sure no Viet Cong are sneaking up on me.'
As Matsuda's officers began putting plans into effect to build the unit into a company, the new commander left Bearcat for an orientation tour to observe how other units were utilizing their long range patrol assets. His visits would take him to the 173rd Airborne Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, 1st Cavalry Division, 101st Airborne Division, 196th Light Infantry Brigade, and the Recon Battalion of the Fleet Marine Division. In addition, Matsuda stopped in at the MACV Recondo School where he obtained lesson plans and operating procedures that would become useful when his unit developed its own recondo training program.
Returning to Bearcat with a better understanding of the organization and direction he wanted for his unit, Matsuda summarized the observations during his visits as follows: 1. The support of the LRRPs varied according to the confidence that senior leadership had in the unit, and, 2. LRRPs must believe they belong to an elite unit made up of tough fighters. The warrior spirit had to be part of the temperament for those selected to perform commando operations in Vietnam.
To help instill the 'warrior spirit,' one of the first requirements the new commander implemented was that patrol members would be fully camouflaged before going out on a mission. This meant applying green and black 'grease paint' to all areas of exposed skin to include ears and the backs of the hands. Prior to Matsuda assuming command, patrol members would smear a little camouflage on their faces, but it was applied in a haphazard manner with thought that darkness would engulf the patrol after they were inserted and that the paint would quickly wash off in the rain and humidity. Matsuda, however, likened the application of camouflage before a mission to American Indians applying war paint to their bodies before going into battle. The process of darkening their skin by using camouflage sticks served notice that the patrol members were preparing to be sent into hostile territory. In a previous assignment as a recon platoon leader, Matsuda noticed that the soldiers who put on the most camouflage always seemed to perform better. The LRRP commander wanted his soldiers to have every possible advantage over the enemy.