The following morning the team was up and moving early. Things were uneventful most of the day. After traveling a couple of thousand meters through thick jungle, stopping several times to listen for any sound of the enemy, at 1100 hours they stopped for 'pot time'. Pot time was 1100 to 1300 hours when the VC would stop for lunch and an afternoon rest. If you moved during this time you were at a disadvantage as the VC being stationary would be more apt to hear your movement.
Late in the afternoon the team leader started to look for a good place to spend the night. The vegetation thinned and they found themselves in a complex of trails. Before they could move out of the area there was VC on both sides. All they could do was lay low and wait for an opportunity to escape and evade. As darkness fell they could hear the VC knocking bamboo sticks hitting together signaling that the team was in the area. Fortunately the patrol found some dense under growth and watched the entire night as lanterns glowed all around them. Thinking the patrol had moved out of the area the VC gave up their search and moved on. The remainder of the patrol was uneventful and the team was extracted two days later. Once back at base camp there was time to relax, drink some beer, and swap stories before the next time out.
Prior to the TET offensive there were several sightings of large groups of NVA and VC units moving to and from Saigon through the Binh Son rubber plantation. The LRRP commander put two LRRP teams together for a special ambush mission. On February 17, 1968, ten LRRPs were inserted into a landing zone just inside the plantation. One of the teams consisted of Staff Sergeants Hilan Jones and Elbert Walden, Sergeant Mike Rohr, along with Specialists Four Donald Dupont and Dave Long. The other team was made up with a group of team leaders, Specialist Four Tom Eggleton, Sergeant Ed Rasen, Staff Sergeant's James Glaze, and David Sellens, and a Private who had just joined from the 101st Airborne. The patrol was designed for the teams to work in concert while at the same time independently in the event that escape and evasion became necessary.
The LRRPs were inserted early that morning without incident. They moved quickly to stake out a major trail and set up the ambush. Jones and his team set up on the right, facing the trail. Eggleton set his team up on the left with about forty meters separating the teams. Walden, Rohr, and Dupont provided security on the right flank while Glaze, Sellens, and the 101st guy secured the left. Eggleton and Rasen strung Claymore mines in their portion of the kill zone as Jones and Long set up the other side.
Shortly after the wiring of the ten claymores was finished and the ambush was in place, three NVA soldiers came moving down the trail from the right to left of the patrol. The ambush was not quite set and they were allowed to pass. Soon to follow was the main force (in excess of 50 NVA soldiers) in full battle gear. The three that passed earlier turned out to be the point element of the larger group.
The NVA soldiers were moving quickly along the trail with only a meter or so between soldiers. Each had a weapon. One carried a mortar tube, another an RPG rocket launcher. All carried rifles, with several carrying rocket grenades and mortar rounds. As the NVA passed into the kill zone Rasen blew the mines on the left and Jones followed blowing the right side.
All hell broke loose as team one came under heavy automatic weapons fire from the trailing enemy that were not caught in the kill zone. Unaware that team one was engaged in a heavy fire fight, Rasen, Sellens, and Glaze ran out to search the kill zone and capture any NVA soldiers that might still be alive. Eggleton and the other guy secured the left flank. In the confusion of the battle, the handset cord on Jones' radio was pulled of at the connection to the PRC25 radio. The remaining NVA broke contact and retreated back down the trail in the direction that they had come. Team one then engaged in securing the right flank and assisting in the search of the bodies on the trail. Specialist Long discovered an NVA soldier tossing a grenade in the direction of Sellens and Rasen. The grenade exploded and shrapnel hit Sellens and Rasen before Long could cover the NVA and take him prisoner.
The LRRPs completed the search of the kill zone which produced the capture of a wounded NVA soldier, an RPG7 rocket launcher with rocket, an 81MM mortar tube, several RPG rockets and mortar rounds, several small arms, plastic explosives, and several pounds of documents. Eggleton called for extraction as the teams completed their search and moved to the pick up zone.
It wasn't long before the choppers were on the scene with the first Huey on the ground making the pick up. Dave Long carried the wounded NVA to the chopper as Rasen, Sellens, Glaze, Dupont, Rohr, and the 101st guy filled the chopper. Jones, Walden, Eggleton, and Long remained on the ground to wait for the second chopper. The four men left on the ground came under automatic weapons fire from the near wood line and Eggleton took a round through both legs.
Walden threw a white phosphorous grenade marking the wood line the NVA were firing from, secured the radio from Eggleton and directed the fire of the gun ships that by then were on station. The cobras immediately fired into the wood line with their rockets and mini guns, suppressing the enemy fire, forcing the enemy to retreat. Jones carried Eggleton to the waiting chopper while Long, Walden, and Glaze provided covering fire into the wood line. Once Jones and Eggleton were safely on the chopper, Long and Walden followed. The chopper lifted of without further incident. Division followed up with an infantry company who found twenty nine dead NVA soldiers on and around the trail. Sellens wounds were superficial but Eggleton and Rasen were seriously wounded. They spent months in the hospital undergoing physical therapy while recovering from their wounds. Fortunately both men would fully recover. Today, Rasen is a successful writer and Eggleton is an executive with Baush and Laum.
Radio relay was conducted using choppers, fixed wing, or anything else that would carry a LRRP and a radio to maintain communications with teams on the ground. Roy Barley had that duty on 17 February. The morning had been a chore because the day before the fellow who was doing the radio relay for the first (and last) time had really fouled things up, having teams plotted way out of position.
After checking the team's location and correctly plotting them on the map, they flew to assist Jones and Eggleton. Since the large LZ was real close to their location, Roy knew that he had to be real close on that. Jones came up on the radio and told Roy that they had "rough peanut butter" (meaning enemy activity) and that they should leave the area because they were spooking them. They flew a short distance away and continued to monitor the situation. Barley doubled checked the other teams to insure they were fine and then flew around the location for about 45 minutes monitoring in case of contact.
Barley was told by the pilot that they needed to return to Bearcat and refuel. Roy told him he was not happy to be returning to the landing strip while there was a team with bad guys around. He was told that if we did not refuel we would be on the ground with them shortly. Roy advised the TOC and down they went.
The fixed wing was in the middle of refueling when a jeep came roaring up and told them that they had to get back in the air ASAP. There was a team in heavy contact and Jones and Eggleton needed support right away. The pilot had barely put in half of the needed fuel. Barley was in the back seat of the aircraft double checking the team locations. He noticed when they landed the pilot had taken the firing levers off the white phosphorus rockets. He had no time to mention to him that he forgot to re-arm the rockets. There were only 4 left as that morning they made a run on a bunker.
When they got back in the air Barley called for Artillery and advised that he would direct. The only guns that could reach the location were in Bear Cat and guess where the gun ships and pickup ships were coming from. Yep, same place. Roy was advised that they would not fire over the birds so he requested some fast movers but their ETA was considerably longer than the gun ships. Talk about frustration! He could see the fire team and slicks but could not make them move any faster.
Roy asked the pilot to fire some WP rockets and that is when he realized that the rockets were not armed. He directed the pilot to fly over the wood line where, based on the radio traffic, the bad guys were. When he did Roy pulled the pins and threw out a couple of fragmentation grenades. The aircraft took a couple of hits by small arms fire but nothing close to any serious damage. The gun ships hit station about then and really worked the bad guys over.
The rest of the day was uneventful and the other teams had no problems in the areas. As soon as they touched down Roy wanted to find out if everyone was all right. That is when he learned Eggleton was hit by AK47 fire in both legs.
Latter that night Roy was back in the air for radio relay check of the teams. All was fine. When they landed he reached to put on his beret and it was not there. It had blown out of his pants pocket while sitting in the door of that slick. Some little dink is probably still wearing it. It was, all in all, a real shitty day. A couple of day's latter Roy was headed to Nha Trang for Recondo School.
Enemy mortars and rockets struck Bearcat for the first time on February 27. Casualties and damage was extremely light as nine rockets and 2 mortars hit the base camp between 1:00 a.m. and 1:15 a.m... Small arms contact was reported from one sector of the perimeter. The division's reaction was quick with light fire teams on station and 256 rounds of artillery fire returned.13
One of the benefits that came with membership in the LRRP unit was slipping off for R&R in Mei Tho or Saigon. All cities were off limits, but if you stayed out of trouble, the military police would generally ignore you. One afternoon in May, Lieutenant Henry Hester, J. W. Boles, Hilan Jones, Herbert Vaughn, along with Kenneth Marze, drove to Mei Tho in the Lt.'s jeep. They were in one of the local bars when the local police made a raid. All except Vaughn were apprehended. The rest were taken to the local police station and told to wait in the courtyard for the MPs. Vaughn had escaped but had the key to the padlock securing the chain locking the steering wheel on the jeep.
Not wanting to answer for a report from the MPs, Lt. Hester took his pistol and shot the lock off the chain (it took three rounds). Everyone jumped in the jeep and headed out of town back to Dong Tam. Vaughn made it back to base camp on his own, long before the others. All is well that ends well and no reports were filed that day.
When First Lieutenant Dale Dickey took command from Captain Clarence Matsuda the company was still designated 9th Infantry Division LPRPs. A few months after that it was changed to Company E, 50th Infantry, Airborne/ Ranger and stayed that way for just short of a year when it was again re-designated. The company was now Company E 75th Rangers. Dale has the bragging rights of being the last LRRP commander, the only E 50th Infantry commander and the first E 75th Ranger commander. The missions really started to change when General Ewell took command of the 9th Infantry Division. He believed in the unique capabilities of the Rangers and knew that they could be his eyes, ears, and yes muscle, when he needed it most. The G-2, Colonel Spiro (?) was also a believer and supporter of the Rangers.
Dale's earliest memories of being the commander was that of being alone without Rick Stetson's calming affect and of not having Captain Matsuda's confidence, vast experience and leadership to fall back on in a tight spot. Here he was almost all alone in charge of guys like Jones, Frost, Dunlap, Nizialek, Walden, and the rest of the mob. One very peaceful morning sitting in his office thinking how great it was that all the teams were quiet, he was interrupted by First Sergeant Melvin Jones who announced that a very angry Major wanted to talk with him. As the Major entered the office he was yelling at the top of his lungs that he would have the entire company sent to jail and Dale relieved of his command if he didn't discipline these two disrespectful NCOs.
From the brief description, he knew the Major was speaking of Frost and Jones. Thank God Dunlap was in the field. It appears they had been drinking and according to them it was just a little beer. They were on stand-down enjoying the amenities of the NCO Club and were walking back to the unit. They took a shortcut across the Major's yard, which had been recently seeded and was growing beautiful, lush grass, just like at home in Virginia. When he yelled at them to get off his grass they responded with something like yea! yea! not realizing or caring that he was a Major.
The Major went on to say that Jones became very disrespectful to him. By this time Jones and Frost were standing in front of their commander providing him with the facts as they knew them to be true. Their version in no way or manner matched with the major's story and of course Jones denied being disrespectful. The Major stated that Jones threaten to "smash him if he didn't get out of his face". Jones' version was that he stated, "If he didn't get out of his face, SIR" and Frost remembered the exact same thing, so figure.
The Major was in a T-shirt and Dale asked him how he was dressed when the confrontation happened. The Major went crazy at which time he was invited to leave the company area as it was really off limits to unauthorized personnel. He left and went to division to see Col. Ira A. Hunt who told him to stay completely away from the Ranger compound and to remove his grass. Hunt told him that if dirt and mud were good enough for General Ewell it was good enough for the Major. Jones and Frost didn't get off completely but it set the picture for things to come for a new inexperienced company commander. Dale commanded other units during his military career and no one threw anything at him that he hadn't seen as commander of the Rangers.
Specialist Four William Francis "Ski" Piaskowski was wounded on March 14 while on a routine patrol in Vinh Long Province with Sergeant Herbert Lee Vaughn, Staff Sergeant Hilan E. Jones, Staff Sergeant Herbert Cornelius Frost, and several others. The patrol was inserted from a navy patrol boat (PBR) and was conducting a search for any signs of enemy activity. At mid-day they came upon hooch that gave all appearances of being occupied. It was a normal abode for the area, complete with the hard packed dirt floor and measured about twenty feet by thirty feet. Contained in the hooch were the normal Vietnamese furnishings. You could smell the incense and burnt charcoal, signs that the place was definitely occupied. Security was put in place and the hooch was searched for enemy weapons, equipment, and any other sign that would give an indication as to the status of the occupants.
A lone Viet Cong came down the trail, right into the ranger positions. He fired one round before running from the area. The rangers returned fire immediately, but the VC was able to escape. That one round found its mark and hit 'Ski' in the chest. Vaughn applied first aid to the chest wound and the team leader called for medical evacuation. Piaskowski was dusted off in short order and prognosis from the medical staff at the field hospital was good. We were all relieved to learn that "Ski" would make it. That evening word came from the hospital that he had died. Feelings of sorrow, anger, and frustration ran through the company area that night. The LRRPs had lost their fifth man after getting him home and thinking that he was going to be all right.
